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Giant Eagle, Inc. v. Phar-Mor, Inc.
Courtney Pasquariello, J.D. Candidate 2010

QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether under bankruptcy law and Pennsylvania common law a lessee corporation that
files for bankruptcy and rejects equipment leases is excused from liability for its breach when the
lessor enters into a substitute lease with a mitigatory lesee that later rejects the substitute lease?

BRIEF ANSWERS
Although under Pennsylvania common law a lessor has a duty to mitigate damages and is
unable to claim damages that could have been avoided, no legal proposition exists that an injured
lessor who attempts mitigation of damages resulting from a lessee’s misconduct must bear the
consequences of a failed effort. Although the lessor received partial mitigation of a claim against
a liable lessee, the lessee nonetheless remains liable for his previous breach.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 1, 1995 Phar-Mor, Inc. (Phar-Mor) entered into leases scheduled to terminate on
September 1, 2008 with Giant Eagle, Inc. and Value Eagle Associations (Giant Eagle) to rent
warehouse equipment owned by each company respectively. On September 24, 2001, eight
years shy of the lease expiration date, Phar-Mor entered a chapter 11 bankruptcy filing. PharMor nevertheless continued to use the warehouse equipment in helping the company disassemble
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over the next several months and continued to pay partial rent during that period. The
bankruptcy court eventually ordered the sale of Phar-Mor’s assets on July 18, 2002 leading to
liquidation sales and final inventory counts.
Following Phar-Mor’s demise, Giant Eagle entered a claim for administrative expenses
resulting from the rents due from the leases during this time. Further, terms in the lease
agreements included an express choice-of-law provision, requiring the use of Pennsylvania law,
as well as another provision which required Phar-Mor to pay liquidated damages at a present
future value rate. However, Giant Eagle, recognizing its duty to mitigate damages, entered into a
substitute, but separate and independent, lease agreement with Snyder Drugstores, Inc. (Snyder)
on October 31, 2002. The new lease terms were for the same equipment at an equal price as had
previously been leased to Phar-Mor however, there was no assumption, release, assignment,
waiver, or novation of Phar-Mor’s leases. Additionally, Snyder’s leases had a different end date
of October 31, 2012.
On September 11, 2003, to Giant Eagle’s dismay, Snyder filed bankruptcy followed by
Snyder’s formal rejection of the leases on November 30, 2003. After Snyder’s rejection Giant
Eagle was not able to make another substitute lease agreement and chose to scrap, sell, and reuse
the equipment. Giant Eagle then filed claims in bankruptcy proceeding for Phar-Mor requesting:
(1) rent owed from the period of September 24, 2001 until September 30, 2002 to cover
administrative expenses; and (2) liquidated damages due for the monthly lease payments over the
remaining period following September 30, 2002 not including the amount that had been
mitigated by the lease with Snyder. Phar-Mor objected to the claims for the administrative
expenses due for the period from July18, 2002 until September 30,2002, however this cost is not
at issue. Phar-Mor also objected to the liquidated damages Giant Eagle was claiming for the
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period after October 31, 2002 during which Giant Eagle had entered into a lease agreement with
Snyder. Phar-Mor claimed that as a result of the substitute lease agreement Giant Eagle was not
suffering from actual damages during this time.

DISCUSSION
A lessee corporation becomes liable for future rent payments when it files for bankruptcy
and rejects an unexpired equipment lease. Here, Giant Eagle, a lessor, claimed that it was owed
“(1) administrative expenses in the form of rents due from September 24, 2001, until September
20, 2002, less the amounts Phar-Mor had already paid; and (2) liquidated damages for monthly
lease payments due for the lease term remaining after September 20, 2002, less the amount
mitigated.” Giant Eagle, Inc. v. Phar-Mor, Inc., 528 F.3d 455, 458 (6th Cir. 2008). Phar-Mor,
on the other hand, argued that once Giant Eagle entered into a subsequent lease agreement with a
third-party, Snyder on October 31, 2002, Giant Eagle had fully mitigated all damages caused by
Phar-Mor and thus Phar-Mor was not liable for any damages occurring after the substitute lease
was formed.
It is undisputed by the courts that Phar-Mor waliable for rent payments from July 18,
2002 until September 30, 2002 despite the fact that Phar-Mor contended that it continued to use
the leased equipment for Giant Eagle’s benefit. Under 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(5) a debtor must pay
rent until he actually rejects a lease. However, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with
the bankruptcy and district courts’ decision favoring Phar-Mor, that in entering a subsequent
lease with Snyder, Giant Eagle had fully mitigated all damages caused by Phar-Mor’s breach of
lease agreement and thus Phar-Mor was not liable after Snyder rejected its lease.
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This memorandum will: I. address the underlying statutory information which must be
known in order to fully understand the case at hand; II. Discuss the arguments of each party and
the lower court history of the case as it made its way up from the bankruptcy court to the district
court to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals; and III. Explain the conclusion of the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals on the issue of failed mitigation reviving dead claims.
I.

Statutory Context
The case Giant Eagle, Inc. v. Phar-Mor, Inc. spawned from 11 U.S.C. § 502(g)(1) and 11

U.S.C. § 365(g). 528 F.3d 455, 461 (6th Cir. 2008). Under 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) an unexpired
lease may be rejected by a bankruptcy trustee and may proceed as if the lease had been breached
by the debtor immediately before the petition date. 11 U.S.C § 365(g) (2006). The purpose of
section 365(b) is to secure the title of a general unsecured creditor for the non-breaching party to
a contract that has not been assumed. As a result, the non-breaching party (lessor) is prompted to
file a proof of claim in order to recover damages according to 11 U.S.C. §502(g)(1). Therefore,
the result of a rejection is an existing breach of contract or lease agreement for which damages
can be recovered. The substantive rights of parties’ under the lease, including measure of
damages, are not affected by the rejection. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY,¶365.09, at 365-81.
II.

Arguments and Lower Court History
It is clear from Giant Eagle and Phar-Mor’s arguments addressing liability that both

parties were approaching the idea of lease rejection and mitigation from two polar opposite and
conflicting view points. While Giant Eagle argued that it was rightfully entitled to damages as a
result of Phar-Mor’s lease rejection and should thus be named a general unsecured creditor for
distribution purposes in Phar-Mor’s bankruptcy proceeding, Phar-Mor disagreed stating that it
was excused from liability after the date of Giant Eagle’s new lease with Snyder. Giant Eagle,
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528 F.3d at 461. Phar-Mor explained that when a lessor enters a subsequent lease agreement
with another party which would have the effect of fully mitigating a prior lease rejection it is as
if the prior breached lease had been assumed or had never existed. Id. Thus the bankruptcy
court, district court, and Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals were left to answer the question of
revival of potentially fully mitigated leases.
The bankruptcy court addressed the issue of damages post lease-rejection first when it
found that Giant Eagle had mitigated all damages resulting from Phar-Mor’s lease rejection
through its replacement lease with Snyder. Id. at 459. The court turned to Pennsylvania state
law to determine the method of calculating damages because the bankruptcy code did not address
this issue. Although Pennsylvania law provided various options when calculating damages, the
most fitting option appeared to be that provided under 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 2A523(a)(6), that a lessor
is able to “pursue any other remedies provided they are in the lease contract”. Id. However, the
court clearly stated that the lessor is obligated to mitigate damages and could not claim
reasonably avoidable damages. The court concluded that once the mitigation of damages by a
lessor has been complete through a re-letting of equipment, the lessor can not later claim
damages for the time period included in the new lease from the debtor if the new lessee breaches
its obligations. Giant Eagle, 528 F.3d at 459–60. Reasoning that to do otherwise would require
a forecasting of viability of all lessees who enter mitigating leases in order to determine if the
mitigating lease will be successful, the court felt that this would be a revival of a debtor’s duty
which would result in four major problems including: (1) uncertainty as the breachor waited to
for the end of the rejected lease term to find out if he would owe damages; (2) forced litigation
by lessor in order to protect himself from the expiration of the statute of limitations in case of
failed mitigation; (3) the creation of an unwanted guarantor or co-debtor relationship between the
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breaching lessee and mitigating lessee; and (4) the lessor’s unjust enrichment resulting from his
being put in a better position than he would have been under the original lease. Id. at 460.
Dissatisfied with the bankruptcy court’s ruling, Giant Eagle appealed this issue to the
district court. Id. Affirming the bankruptcy court’s decision, the district court stated that Giant
Eagle failed to demonstrate that the lease obligations of Phar-Mor could be revived after
mitigation and replaced by a new lease agreement with Snyder. However, the district court cited
no other law or additional reasoning for its opinion. Id. at 461.
III.

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals Ruling
Upon its de novo review of the issue, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the

district court erred when it disallowed Giant Eagle’s rightful claim for future-rent damages
resulting from Phar-Mor’s lease rejection based on the fact that the substitute lease with Snyder,
if completed, would have provided mitigation for the claimed damages. Because this case
presented a question of law, the circuit court recognized that the bankruptcy court’s factual
findings were not material to the disposition of the appeal. Id.
Accepting proper lease rejection under 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) this court was still left to
determine “how to properly quantify such a claim-first ‘as of the date of the filing of the petition’
(i.e., benefit of the lease bargain), and then, ‘except to the extent that such claim is unenforceable
against the debtor’ (i.e., actual damages).” Id. at 462. For this calculation the court relied on
state law provided that it did not clash with bankruptcy law, and again decided, just as the
bankruptcy court had, that the 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 2A523(a)(6) provided the most fitting method of
calculation. Id. at 463. Additionally, finding support in, In re Steiner, the court concluded that
Giant Eagle was only entitled to actual damages so as not to unjustly enrich the lessor who was
returned his property, thus having it available for release, as a result of the prior lease rejection.
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50 B.R. 181, 183 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985); Giant Eagle, 528 F.3d at 462. In order to avoid
unjust enrichment, the proper equation was to first determine the benefit of original lease as of
the time of filing of the petition and then subtract the amount reasonably mitigated, here the
amount mitigated through Snyder’s one-year lease. Giant Eagle, 528 F.3d at 463.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that the four consequences that plagued the
bankruptcy court were flawed from the beginning to the end starting with the fact that the court
was working under the false assumption that obligations of the original lessee were terminated in
the event of subsequent mitigation. Additionally, the bankruptcy court’s argument that if
allowed this so-called revival would leave behind an anxious debtor wondering if he would have
to pay damages at some unpredictable future date was also erroneous in that this is a question of
the duration of the statute of limitations and thus is left up to legislation. For under this scenario,
the possible debtor would be waiting no longer to find out if he had to pay for his breach than if a
lessor had taken his time in filing an original claim for damages. Furthermore, the problem of
forced litigation by a lessor in order to ensure protection against failed mitigation is also a statute
of limitations problem left up to the legislature. Finally, the court of appeals struck down the
idea that by allowing the lessor to recover damages from two breaching parties, rather than a
single party, the lessor would be in a better position than had had been under the original claim
because it simply was not true. Id. at 464–65.
Moreover, although Phar-Mor argued that the bankruptcy court had to calculate the claim
at the time of lease rejection, taking into consideration possible reasonable future re-let value
rather than actual values, this case was very unique in the fact that both leases were rejected
within a very short period of time making the actual re-let value available to the court during the
time of calculations. Id. at 465. Considering both this unique set of circumstances as well as
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Phar-Mor’s reliance on In re American Home Patient, Inc., a case that did not even address the
possibility of mitigation the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found Phar-Mor’s argument baseless.
414 F.3d 614, 618–19; Giant Eagle, 528 F.3d at 465–66. As a result, the court chose not to
ignore the true re-let values. Id. at 465. Finally, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down
Phar-Mor’s stand that Giant Eagle should “suffer the consequences of [its] mitigation efforts
with Snyder” due to the claim’s lack of support in law. Id. at 466.

CONCLUSION
As the result of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ judgment in Giant Eagle, Inc. v.
Phar-Mor, Inc., a lessor who attempts to mitigate damages resulting from a prior lessee’s breach
of contract but suffers from failed mitigation is not required to bear the consequences of the
failed mitigation. 528 F.3d 455, (6th Cir. 2008). Because the substitute lease entered into by the
lessor and a third-party is not a novation of the original lessees obligations, the failed mitigation
does not result in a revival of a past claim against a debtor, but rather a renewal of a debt that has
yet to expire under the clearly stated statute of limitations. To hold otherwise would require the
creation of a new law, a power which has not been granted to the court, for “there is no
proposition in law or equity that an injured party who attempts to mitigate the damage that
results from another party’s misconduct must ‘suffer the consequences’ of its attempting to
mitigate”. Id. Therefore, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was correct in deciding this case for
Giant Eagle and enforcing its claim of damages resulting from Phar-Mor’s lease rejection.
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